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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

JERIME H. ANDERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20040120-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Conspiracy to Commit
Murder, a second-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-4-201 and §76-5203.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENTED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND
TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY HIS
ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
EVIDENCE THAT WAS INADMISSIBLE?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter
of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of
counsel.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the

United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted in State v.

1

Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was ineffective.
The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at
693.
POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING
TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE
CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE FOR THE REASONS
THAT THERE WAS TNSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly preserved for appeal
therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, a defendant must
show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
(See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) and State v. Olsen,
860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993)). In cases where the claim is insufficient evidence,
this Court has held " as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not
be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000) However, the
Court went further to state, " It necessarily follows that the trial court plainly errs if it
submits the case to the jury and thus fails to discharge a defendant when the
insufficiency of the evidence is apparent to the court." (Id. at 351)
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POINT III
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE
DEFENDANT, SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE REGARDING
PRIOR
DRUG
USAGE
AND
PRIOR
PRISON
INCARCERATION?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly preserved for appeal
therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, a defendant must
show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court, and (3) the error is harmful." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State
v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah CtApp. 1992) and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332,
334 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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UTAH CONSITITUION
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. [RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not
be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the
use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined
by statute or rule, (emphasis added)
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 76-4-201. Conspiracy — Elements of offense.
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that
conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons to engage
in or cause the performance of the conduct and any one of them commits an overt act
in pursuance of the conspiracy, except where the offense is a capital felony, a felony
against the person, arson, burglary, or robbery, the overt act is not required for the
commission of conspiracy.
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Section 76-5-203. Murder1.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life,
the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and
thereby causes the death of another;
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate
offense, or is a party to the predicate offense;
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the
course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the
commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; and
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense;
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission
or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section
76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer;
(3) Murder is a first degree felony.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 17
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment,
or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense.
Rule 19
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom
unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to
object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid manifest injustice.
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
1

Selected portions of this statute are included in the brief. The full text of the statute
is attached in the Addendum.
5

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefiilness of the victim offered by the prosecution
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607,608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if
it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and
403.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged in an information dated October 3, 2002, with the
offense of Murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203.
On August 4, 2003, the Defendant made an initial appearance and the information was
read. On September 12, 2003 and October 6, 2003, the preliminary hearing was held,
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the matter was bound over for trial, and the court set trial to begin December 2,2003.
On October 9, 2003 an amended information was filed charging the defendant with
the offense of Murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5203 and Conspiracy to Commit Murder, a second-degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-4-201 and §76-5-203. The jury trial was held on December 2, 2003
and December 3,2003, with the Honorable Judge Ben Hadfield presiding.
After a two-day jury trial, the jury returned with a verdict of not guilty on
Count I, Murder, a first-degree felony and a verdict of guilty on count II, Conspiracy
to Commit Murder, a second-degree felony. On January 21, 2004, the Defendant was
sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of 1-15 years in prison on
count two. That commitment was entered on January 28, 2004. The Defendant was
transported to the Utah State Prison to commence his prison term. The Defendant filed
his notice of appeal on February 2,2004.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 27, 2002, a body was discovered on an access road by the
Portage Utah exit off 1-15 in Box Elder County Utah. (R. 185 / 88) Detective
Cosgrove of the Box Elder County Sheriffs Department investigated the scene and
found a male individual lying on his back with a left shoe missing. He discovered two
bullet holes in his shirt and massive trauma to the back of the head. (R. 185 / 90)
Detective Cosgrove also determined by a tread mark on the victim's shirt that the
victim had been run over by a vehicle. (R. 185 / 95) A search of the victim revealed
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some small bindles of cocaine or methamphetamine and the victim's ID. (R. 185 / 95)
The ID matched the victim and revealed that he was a 19-year-old male from
Pocatello, Idaho named Timothy Lords. (R. 185 / 96) Detective Cosgrove opined that
due to the small amount of blood at the location where the body was found, that it was
evident that the victim had been shot elsewhere and taken to the location and dumped.
(R. 185/99)
Detective Collins of the Pocatello Police Department testified that on
September 27, 2002, he interrogated the defendant in the Bingham County jail in
Blackfoot Idaho. Detective Collins stated that the defendant claimed that he, Mr.
Lords and a Jared Mendoza were going to Ogden, Utah to buy some drugs. (R. 185 /
102) He claimed that the defendant said that he and Mr. Mendoza had picked up the
victim at Tonya Toler's residence and traveled to Utah. (R. 185 / 103) On the return
trip from Ogden, he told the detective that they stopped at the Portage exit to "go to
the bathroom" and to switch positions in the car. (R. 185 / 105)
Detective Collins testified that the defendant gave several varying accounts of
the occurrence at the Portage exit, but generally that he was in the car and suddenly
heard a shot or shots. (R. 185 / 107) There was some confusion as to whether or not
the first shot occurred in or out of the vehicle (R. 185 /118) There is no question that
Mr. Lords was the victim in the shooting. (R. 185 / 120) After hearing the shots he
ran approximately 50 yards down the road and was then picked up by Mr. Mendoza.
(R. 185 / 108-110) The defendant claimed that Mr. Mendoza told him that the
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shooting was accidental. (R. 185 / 111) The defendant gave two accounts as to how he
discovered that the vehicle had been burned. (R. 185/113-115)
Mr. Mendoza testified that he had admitted to the shooting of Mr. Lords and
was serving a prison sentence for that first-degree felony murder. (R. 185/ 120) He
testified that the defendant had provided him with the gun he used in the murder. (R.
185/ 120, 132) He stated that the two of them had planned the homicide because the
defendant believed the victim was a snitch. (R. 185/121)
Mr. Mendoza then testified, without any objection by defense counsel, about a
prior drug related kidnapping involving the defendant and sexual encounters also
involving the defendant. (R. 185 / 125, 126) Defense counsel also allowed the
prosecution to get into extensive testimony concerning drug trafficking that the
defendant had allegedly been involved in with Mr. Mendoza as well as other people.
(R. 185/128,129)
Mr. Mendoza, again with no objection from defense counsel, testified that he
and the defendant got high on methamphetamine. (R. 185 / 134) He then claimed that
the defendant told him to kill the victim or the defendant would kill Mr. Mendoza. (R.
185 / 134)

Mr. Mendoza claimed that the defendant gave him a "prison look"

"Everybody that's been to prison has the same look." (R. 185 / 136) Mr. Mendoza
then testified that he shot the victim three times, killing him with the final shot to the
back of the victim's head. (R. 185 / 137) Mr. Mendoza stated that by the third shot,
the defendant had already exited the vehicle and was running away. He took the
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victim's gun, and pulled him out of the car and then got in and drove off to pick up the
defendant. (R. 185/139)
Detective Cosgrove testified, with no objection from defense counsel, that
when the police arrested the defendant there were "narcotics in his possession and a
large amount of cash." (R. 186 /l 1) He also stated that the defendant had told him that
he had "smoked or used [a half ounce of methamphetamine] for personal use over a
few days." (R. 186/12)
Detective Cosgrove admitted that despite extensive searching the police were
unable to locate either gun that Mr. Mendoza said he ditched. (R. 186 / 18)
The testimony of absent witness Tonya Toler was read to the jury during which
she testified that the defendant and Mr. Mendoza were going to do something to Mr.
Lords. (R. 186 / 24) She later denied telling the police that this conversation involved
another individual. (R. 186 / 27)
Detective Bush, with no objection from defense counsel, then testified that Ms.
Toler had told him that the two individuals involved in the above conversation were
the defendant and Michael Woodby. (R. 186 / 29) He also said that there was other
evidence that Michael Woodby was one of the prime suspects in the shooting. (R. 186
/30)
A video tape recording of an interview of the defendant by Detective Collins
was then played to the jury. During the video, (which was transcribed by the court
reporter) the detective asked the defendant "when was the last time you used?" to

10

which the defendant answered, "I didn't use all day yesterday. The night before." (R.
186 / 43) This testimony was not objected to by defense counsel.
The defendant then described the events of the day, stating that Mr. Mendoza,
the victim and he drove from Idaho to Ogden to get some drugs. On the way back to
Idaho the victim began shooting a gun out of the window of the car. (R. 186 / 54) At
Jared Mendoza's request they stopped at the Portage exit so he could relieve himself
and so Jared and the victim could switch seats. (R. 186/ 55) As they began to drive
suddenly the defendant heard a loud gunshot and the victim said, "I've been shot". (R.
186 / 56) He observed Jared shoot the victim again and the defendant then jumped
from the car and began running. Shortly thereafter Jared drove up in the car and told
the defendant to get in, and the two of them left. (R. 186 / 57)
In the video the defendant stated that Mr. Mendoza told him the first shot was
an accident, and that he shot him in the head because he was still alive. (R. 186/58,
61) The defendant said that Mr. Mendoza kept referring to the Mexican Mafia and
referring to the victim as a rat. (R. 186 / 57, 71,72)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant raises two major issues in the appeal, both of which are
predicated upon an overriding issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant
believes that his 6th and 14th amendment rights under the United States Constitution as
well as his Article I Section 7 and 12 rights under the Constitution of the State of Utah
were violated by the ineffective assistance of counsel rendered in the trial portion of
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this case. The trial defense attorney committed two major errors during the course of
the trial.
The first error that the defense counsel made was failing to move for dismissal
at the conclusion of this prosecution's case. This error was in light of the trial court's
suggestion that a motion may be timely made. Shortly before the State rested, the trial
court, in order to move the trial along, stated, "If you have a motion to make when
they rest, I'll [allow] you to make that at the recess if counsel want to stipulate as
such, if there's any motions when they rest." (R. 186/8)
The second error committed by trial counsel was allowing significant and
damaging evidence to be heard by the jury concerning the defendant's prior drug
usage, prior sexual indiscretions, and evidence of prior prison confinement. That
unchallenged testimony improperly maligned the defendant's character in the eyes of
the jury and eroded the presumption of innocence. These errors were fiirther
compounded by the fact that defense counsel did not call the defendant to testify, thus
eliminating the claim of trial strategy. Both of these failings constituted inadequate
assistance of counsel, and plain error or manifest injustice.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND
TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS
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ATTORNEY FAILED TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT AND FAILED TO OBJECT TO
EVIDENCE THAT WAS INADMISSIBLE.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 'the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel.9' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a
two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was ineffective. "First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.

This requires

showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave some
guidance in noting; "The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 688) Although the Court
in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", (Id. at 688) it did mention
certain minimal requirements.
In Strickland, the Court stated:
Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge
the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the
particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted
defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of
reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions
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were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In
making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's
function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the
adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time,
the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment. (Id. at 690)
Additionally, the overreaching requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective
assistance of counsel cases is that the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." (Id. at 688)
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsels
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above.
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the Court was
presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct proper
discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 4th Amendment.
The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction under an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. In that affirmation of
reversal the Court stated:
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant
must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that
there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been
different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual
prejudice. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365,375 (1986))
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to comport with
constitutional requirements the Court held:
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In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally creditable
enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent and pervasive
failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." [citation
omitted] Under these circumstances, although the failure of the District
Court and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall
performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional assistance in
the respects alleged. (Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386
(1986))
In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 02-311, (U.S. 2003) the U.S. Supreme Court
found that counsel's failure to investigate the extensive abuse the defendant had
suffered through his life was unreasonable. The Court reversed his conviction on the
grounds that this failure resulted in defense counsels inability to present this evidence
to the sentencing jury in a capital case. The Court stated:
We further find that had the jury been confronted with this considerable
mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have
returned with a different sentence. (Wiggins v. Smith at Point III)
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have likewise
rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can guide a
determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties.
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) the Court
found held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a 4th Amendment violation
constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. In that case, the Court
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applied the Strickland test to a situation where defense counsel had in a pretrial
motion moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The trial court
denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. During trial the
officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of plain view, yet trial counsel did
not re-raise the motion to suppress. The Court held that "where a defendant can show
that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions,
the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d
351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court
expanded the Strickland test in certain circumstances. The Court stated:
It is true that while the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for
resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, there are
situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental fairness may
affect the analysis.
In Williams v. Taylor, the Court reversed the defendant's death sentence on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the defense counsel did not investigate
the defendant's "nightmarish childhood", nor the fact that the defendant was
"borderline mentally retarded" (Id. at 395, 396) The Court concluded that defense
counsel unreasonably failed to begin mitigation investigation until one week prior to
trial, and then unreasonably failed to investigate numerous areas of mitigating
evidence that could have benefited the defendant in the penalty phase.
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In the case of State v. Bennett 999 P.2d 1, 3, (Utah 2000) Justice Durham, in a
concurring opinion noted:
This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has been
recognized in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, ,
442 (Utah 1996) (noting, in ineffective assistance of counsel case, that
"pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, we may
presume prejudice in circumstances where it is unnecessary and illadvised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice"
Finally, in the case of State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)
the Utah Court of Appeals was presented with a case very similar to the case at bar.
The court reversed a defendant's conviction under an ineffective assistance of counsel
theory where counsel "fail[ed] to move for a directed verdict after the State failed to
present evidence that Smith did not possess a valid concealed weapon permit during
its case in chief."
In the present case defense counsel failed to move for a directed verdict after
the State had rested. This was in light of the fact that the trial court even suggested
such a motion. The irrefutable result of this failure was to deny the trial court the
opportunity to dismiss the case for a lack of evidence, and to heighten any appellate
review to a plain error standard. The issue of insufficient evidence will be more fully
reviewed in point II below.
Furthermore, defense counsel, without any justifiable reason, failed to object to
evidence that was clearly inadmissible. The result of this failure took from the trial
court the duty to conduct a Rule 403 analysis and resulted in a heightened appellate
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review standard of plain error. This failure will be more fully discussed in point III
below.
In State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) the Utah Court of
Appeals held "We conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise this lack of evidence as
a basis for dismissal of the charge is 'so deficient as to fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness.'" (Citations omitted) In the present case there is simply
no reason for trial counsel not make the proper motions and to raise the obvious
objections. This failure clearly fulfills the 1st prong of the Strickland test.
The 2nd prong of the test is whether "counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." (Strickland, at
466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.) Again in the case of State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648,
655 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) the Court ruled that "[h]ad trial counsel raised this lack of
evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have dismissed
the concealed weapon charge." In the case at bar, defense counsel's deficiency in
recognizing the lack of evidence, and failure to object and conduct a Rule 403 review
constituted the failure and the prejudicial result contemplated in Strickland.
It is important to note that Defense counsel did not even raise that possibility
for the trial court to decide these issues. This lack of cognition of an essential element
of the trial constitutes unreasonable assistance "considering all the circumstances."
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING
TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE
CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE FOR REASONS THAT
THERE WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION.
In the case of State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000) the Utah Supreme
Court held "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised
on appeal." However, this general rule is tempered when trial counsel's performance
falls below a reasonable standard. The Court in State v. Holgate, went further to state,
" It necessarily follows that the trial court plainly errs if it submits the case to the jury
and thus fails to discharge a defendant when the insufficiency of the evidence is
apparent to the court." (Id. at 351 emphasis added)
The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in challenging
a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. In the case of State v. Silva 13
P.3d 604 (Utah App. Ct. 2000) the court stated, "[TJhis court's power to review a jury
verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence is limited." (Citations omitted)
The Utah Supreme Court has said, "So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime
can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 27 P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah
2001) (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981,984 (Utah
1993) the Court stated, "Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or
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reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the juiy
verdict."
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient evidence
establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court may overturn a
conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Court reversed a conviction of
sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is
based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of
guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, expert or otherwise, that
the photograph in question could have been taken for purposes of sexual arousal.
Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the defendant's guilty verdict.
Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) the Court
reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second degree murder case where the
evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case there was undisputed evidence that the
victim had been murdered. The sole evidence against the defendant consisted of the
fact that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he
had related a dream to three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that
he "thought he hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." (Id at 446) In that case
the Court stated:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap between
the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its
duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does
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not mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining
gap in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost
limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 2002)
the Court, again recognizing the significant standard of review required to reverse a
conviction in an insufficient evidence appeal, reversed the trial court's conviction of
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined that a
second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. No other
evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was found, but
rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had the motive and
opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that conviction, the Court
held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the evidence
supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the opportunity to
destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it ever existed.
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence in
support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an extensive
marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported.

Although it is

undisputed that the Defendant was in the vehicle when the crime occurred. It is also
undisputed that the individual who committed the killing was not the defendant. The
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only evidence of the defendant's involvement in this crime was the unsupported
testimony of Mr. Mendoza, the admitted triggerman.
Although the transcript of Tonya Toler was read to the jury as part of the
evidence in the case, her testimony did little to enlighten the jury. She claimed that the
defendant and Mr. Mendoza were going to take the victim to Utah "to do some things
to him." (R. 186 / 24) The bulk of this testimony was contradicted by Detective Bush,
who recalled Ms. Toler's statement much differently than the transcript described.
With only that insignificant evidence, the trial court should have taken the
initiative, on its own motion, to dismiss the case as insufficient to support a
conviction.
POINT ffl
THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN ADMITTING
EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT,
SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE REGARDING PRIOR DRUG
USAGE, AND PRIOR PRISON INCARCERATION.
On numerous occasions throughout the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony
regarding the defendant's prior drug usage. During the course of the trial Mr.
Mendoza then testified, without any objection by defense counsel, about a prior drug
related kidnapping involving the defendant and sexual encounters also involving the
defendant. (R. 185 / 125, 126) Defense counsel also allowed the prosecution to get
into extensive testimony concerning drug trafficking that the defendant had allegedly
been involved in with Mr. Mendoza as well as other people. (R. 185 /128, 129)
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Mr. Mendoza, again with no objection from defense counsel, testified that he
and the defendant got high on methamphetamine. (R. 185 / 134)
Detective Cosgrove testified, with no objection from defense counsel, that
when the police arrested the defendant there were "narcotics in his possession and a
large amount of cash." (R. 186 /l 1) He also stated that the defendant had told him that
he had "smoked or used [a half ounce of methamphetamine] for personal use over a
few days." (R. 186 /12) This same evidence was reinforced by the playing of a video
tape recording of the interview of the defendant by Detective Cosgrove.
Also during the trial Mr. Mendoza claimed that the defendant gave him a
"prison look" "Everybody that's been to prison has the same look." (R. 185 / 136)
None of the above statements were objected to by defense counsel and therefore the
defense concedes that they must establish plain error to prevail on this point.
"To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur,
(2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful.
State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174
(Utah CtApp. 1992) In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App.
1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not reverse unless we
determine that an error existed, and that the error was both obvious and harmful". The
Court further ruled, "An error is harmful if the likelihood of a different result is
'sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" (Id at 1010/
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In the case of State v. Kooyman, 2005 WL 1176055 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) this
Court affirmed a trial court's decision to allow evidence of prior drug usage by the
defendant, but did "share some of Kooyman's concerns regarding this challenged
evidence," (Id. at f 19) In that case, the evidence was allowed to prove a noncharacter issue of knowledge of a date rape drug, alleged to have been used in the
crime at issue.
In State v. Miller, 104 P.3d 1272,1278, (Utah Ct. App. 2004) the Court stated:
When determining whether evidence of other bad acts is admissible
under Rule 404(b), the trial court must conduct a three-part test. It must
inquire, "(l)wliether such evidence is being offered for a proper
noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the
requirements of rule 402 and (3) whether this evidence meets the
requirements of rule 403. (quoting State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, (Utah
1999) (citations omitted, emphasis added)
Furthermore, in the case of State v. Fedorowicz, 52 P.3d 1194, 2001 (Utah
2002) the Court held:
In determining whether evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is
admissible, the trial court must initially decide whether the evidence is
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose rather than only to show the
defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. If the evidence is
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, then the court must
determine whether the proffered evidence is relevant under Utah Rules
of Evidence 402. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the
proffered evidence is admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence 403.
(citations omitted, emphasis added)

In the present case defendant would submit that the errors were both obvious
and harmfiil. Examining the evidence that the defendant had used an extensive
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amount of methamphetamine on prior occasions, or that the defendant had been to
prison simply shows no legitimate purpose for the prosecution to ask questions
regarding this topic. The gratuitous questioning on this subject could be used for only
one purpose, that being to prejudice the jury against the defendants.
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in relevant part:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of
the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
There was never any attempt to show that this evidence was being used to prove
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident." Furthermore, there was never any advanced notice of the
prosecutions intent to introduce this evidence at trial.
Even if there had been some attempt to utilize the evidence of the defendant's
drug usage for purposes of "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident", prior to it's admission the trial court
would be required to conduct a Rule 403 inquiry.2 This was simply never done. Even
if the trial court had conducted this exercise, there could be no legitimate reason for

2

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
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predictable and resulted in the conviction of the defendant on the charge of
conspiracy.
Perhaps the most telling result of the prosecutors attempt to improperly use this
evidence of prior bad acts was during his closing statement where he stated:
"Why Ladies and Gentlemen, would somebody in this world, in this
drug world where snitches are killed—" (R. 186 at 138 question
interrupted and objected to by defense counsel5).
In State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) The Court set forth six
factors that should be utilized when using the balancing test of Rule 403.
When conducting a Rule 403 review of prior bad acts evidence, trial
courts should consider several factors, including: (1) " fthe strength of
the evidence as to the commission of the other [bad acts],1 " (2) " 'the
similarities between the [charged offense and the prior bad acts],1 " (3) "
f
the interval of time that has elapsed between the [charged offense and
the prior bad acts],1" (4) " 'the need for the evidence,' " (5) " 'the efficacy
of alternative proof,' " and (6) M 'the degree to which the evidence will
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.' " ( citing State v. Widdison, 28
P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001)(quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96
(Utah 1988)).
In applying this analysis to the case at bar there is simply no probative value of
the evidence (drug usage and prior prison incarceration) admitted. (1) The strength of
the evidence of the prior bad acts is admitted by the defendant. (2) There were no
similarities between the use of methamphetamine and the crime charged. There was
absolutely no attempt to tie the prior prison incarceration to the crime other than for
Mr. Mendoza to say the defendant used a "prison look" during the commission of the

5

Trial court overruled the objection. (R. 186 /138)
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crime. (3) There was a several weeks or several hour lapse between the drug usage
and the crime, which would have some diminutive probative value, but there was no
evidence of relevance of time with the prison incarceration issue. (4) The was no
articulable reason for the introduction of this evidence to prove any of the elements of
the offense charged. (5) The State could conceivably claim the need of this evidence
to bolster a failing case. (6) Finally, the degree to which the evidence would arouse
the hostility of the jury is obvious based upon the extensive media coverage linking
drug usage and criminal conduct as discussed above, as well as the general prejudicial
effect of prior prison incarceration.
This Court, in the case of State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App. 1990)
has held; "Generally, inquiry into the details of prior convictions has been found to be
so prejudicial as to amount to plain error". This Court further observed, "In such
cases, the court will reach the issue on appeal despite the lack of objection". (Id. at
821). See also United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987).
In the case of State v. Cravens, 15 P.3d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) this Court
ruled that the admission of a defendant's prior burglary record in a trial on a charge of
threatening with a dangerous weapon constituted error. The Court stated:
Accordingly, the nature of defendant's prior conviction for burglary
neither has any bearing on defendant's veracity as a witness, nor is such
a conviction admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). In fact, we are unable to
discern any probative value that defendant's burglary conviction might
have on the present matter. (Id. At 638)
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the introduction of this evidence. The alleged crime was a crime of murder and
conspiracy to commit murder and the usage of methamphetamine weeks before the
crime or the day of the crime would have absolutely no probative value.
Although it is conceivable that the prosecutor will argue that the evidence is
needed to support the theory that the defendant ordered the killing because the victim
was a snitch, defendant fails to see why drug usage or prison time assists the jury in
this decision. Defendant acknowledges that the inquiry regarding the defendant taking
over a drug dealing business was admissible. The problematic line of questioning was
the drug usage and the prior prison time of the defendant.

The prejudicial effect of

this type of evidence is staggering. The constant bombardment in all types of media
concerning the harmful effects of drug usage is obvious. The clear message of this
type of media exposure is to establish that drug usage is not only harmful to the user,
but also as a direct precursor other criminal behavior such as murder or conspiracy to
commit murder4.
The prosecutor clearly recognized this media induced prejudice when he
decided to ask the questions of Ms. Martinez regarding the prior drug usage of the
defendant. The prejudicial effect to the defendant, in the eyes of the jury was easily

3

The jury found the defendant guilty only of the conspiracy charge.
The Presidents website on drugs at www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov reports that; "of
those incarcerated for murder, 27 percent of State prisoners and 29 percent of Federal
prisoners admitted committing their offense to get money to buy drugs."

4
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Likewise, in the present case the State can show no possible probative reason
for the introduction of the evidence of either the defendant's prior drug usage, or the
fact that the defendant had previously been to prison.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant respectfully requests this court reverse
the Defendant's conviction and, if reversed for grounds of insufficient evidence,
remand for dismissal, if reversed for grounds of Rule 403 and 404 violations or
inadequate assistance of counsel, remand for a new trial.
DATED MsW
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ADDENDUM A

Section 76-5-203. Murder.
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18
years of age;
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5404.1;
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the
actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another;
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate
flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a
party to the predicate offense;
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of
the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or
attempted commission of any predicate offense; and
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense;
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or
attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer;
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced

pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under
Section 76-5-205.5.
(3) Murder is a first degree felony.
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or
excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under
the existing circumstances.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include:
(i) a condition resultingfrommental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the
reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.
Amended by Chapter 146, 2003 General Session

ADDENDUM B

FIRST DISTRICT - Box Elder COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021100144 FS

JERIME H ANDERSON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BEN HADFIELD
January 21, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
shaunaw
Prosecutor: AMY F HUGIE
H THOMAS STEVENSON
BRAD C SMITH
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN V GRAVIS
Video
Tape Count: 9:20 9:27 AM
CHARGES
2. CONSPIRACY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 12/03/2003 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of CONSPIRACY a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the 3CX ELDER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will ioe ccnfi.ied.

?aae

Case No: 021100144
Date:
Jan 21, 2004

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
SENTENCE TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVE TO ANY OTHER SENTENCES.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT TO BE HOUSED IN THE SAME FACILITY AS
CO-DEFENDANT MENDOZA. THE BOARD OF PARDONS IS TO CONSIDER THAT THE
VICTIM DID DIE AS A RESULT OF THE CONSPIRACY.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$5025.00
$0.00
$2308.78
$5025.00
$5025.00
$0
$2308.78
$5025.00
Plus Interest

THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE PSI IS ADDRESSED.
MADE BY THE VICTIMS MOTHER AND SISTER.
Dated this

day of

COMMENTS ARE

!0

BEN HADFIELD
District Court Judge

